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1 Introduction
Dollarization, or the oﬃcial adoption by a foreign country of the US dollar as the
legal circulating liability, is the ultimate expression of a Þxed exchange rate system.
Fixed exchange rate regimes have been extensively studied in the literature. Much
less eﬀort has been devoted though to the study of the aspects that make dollarization
diﬀerent from less rigid Þxed exchange rate regimes (see Berg and Borensztein (2000)
for a general discussion). This paper focuses on an important distinction between a
dollarized system and a currency board: dollarization can be used as a more credible
commitment devise to thwart the use of inßationary tax to Þnance banking system
bailouts.
It is not uncommon to Þnd central banks that provide de facto full deposit insur-
ance whenever the banking system experiences generalized Þnancial distress. Gropp
and Vesala (2000), for instance, provide suggestive empirical evidence to document
this fact. Most of the time those rescues are Þnanced with inßationary tax (see
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)). In particular, the central bank prints money to
reimburse depositors from banks experiencing diﬃculties. Either for political reasons
or issues of economic feasibility, the inßationary tax is a timely available tax and
hence becomes the central banks preferred source of funding in these emergency
situations. Adopting a system of dollarization allows the central bank to ex ante shut
down such a source of easy funding. One may wonder though why a benevolent
central bank would want to reduce the number of available instruments at hand to
deal with an eventual aggregate crisis. A possible explanation can be traced to the
political dynamics of the problem. Even in the case when a bailout is not the desired
policy, the government may not be able to bear the political pressure impinged by
interest groups that directly beneÞt from the bailout. In addition, the fact that the
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central bank may give in to political pressures in the event of bank failures distorts
the ex ante risk-taking behavior of individuals (see Bolton and Rosenthal (1999)). In
those situations then it may well be the case that using dollarization as a commit-
ment technology can allow the Central Bank to resist the aforementioned political
demands.
But this raises a new question for the central bank, mainly how to respond to
collective bank failures when the economy is dollarized. One possibility is to try to
avoid Þnancial-banking crisis altogether. For this, international banks may be worth
considering. Regional banking crises usually are associated with negative develop-
ments in the real sectors of the economy. When the expectations of future prosperity
fall, the price of real assets adjusts downward. However, the banking system debt
balances are in nominal terms. In general this brings about an abrupt deterioration
of the debt-collateral ratios and induces the banking system into a crisis. For an
excellent description of one of these episodes see Beers, Sargent and Wallace (1983)
(see also Chang and Velasco (1998) and Velasco (1987) for a Latin American perspec-
tive). In a way, these kind of Þnancial crises are a matter of portfolio diversiÞcation.
The shock to the real economy on a speciÞc region induces the whole portfolio of
the banks in that region to become insolvent. In the case of international banks, the
part of the portfolios that is associated with assets in a particular country or region
is in general relatively small. Hence, a regional shock can get pooled into a large set
of other shocks and not become a problem for the Þnancial health of the banks (see
Calvo (2000), Section VI).1
The objective in this paper is to study the relationship between banking sector
bailouts, political pressures, and the decision to dollarize the economy. We will also
1Calvo (2000) also discuss the recent process of liability dollarization that has been under way in
some of the Emerging Market Economies. He provides an insightful review of how this phenomenon
can alter some of the dynamics of the Þnancial crises motivating the present paper.
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study the economic and political complementarities that bank internationalization
and dollarization have in this type of situation.
In the next section, we present a simple stylized economy where banks play a role
and countries (regions) suﬀer sporadic aggregate shocks on the return to investment.
In Section 3 we use the model to identify some of the factors that determine when the
decision to bailout the banking system is an appropriate response for a benevolent
monetary-banking authority. Section 4 shows how the political system may inßuence
those ex ante decisions driving to unsatisfactory ex-post outcomes. Also in this
section, we introduce our version of the dollarization policy. Basically, we argue that
in our simple model dollarization can be thought of as equivalent to a policy by which
the Central Bank ex-ante shuts down the Þscal (tax) sources of funds that would
be used in a bailout of the banking system. In this manner, the monetary-banking
authority manages to commit to no future (de-facto) deposit-insurance policies driven
by political pressures. Section 5 studies how the economic and political decisions
depend on the existence of international Þnancial institutions. We show that even
though the dollarization policy may not obtain suﬃcient support when introduced
alone, when combined with a system of international banks it can become politically
viable. And we also show that the internationalization of banks would need to be
combined with (oﬃcial) dollarization if investors in the economy are to choose the
international banks over the domestic banks. Section 6 presents the conclusions.
2 A Simple Model
The model presented in this section is an adaptation of Ennis (2000), which draws
on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Consider an economy (a country) populated by
overlapping generations of agents. Each agent lives for two periods and consumes the
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only good in the economy, the numeraire. They are all risk neutral and discount the
future according to the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). There are three groups of agents in
each generation: investors, depositors and banks. There is also a monetary-banking
authority that we will call the Central Bank (CB).
The size of each group of agents is exogenously given. It is no hard to endogenize
the size of the groups but it would only complicate matters without adding to the
point that is being made. Let (1− α) be the size of the group of investors, α− θ the
size of the group of depositors, and θ the size of the group of banks. The measure of
all agents in a generation is thus equal to one.
Agents are born with type dependent endowments: investors are endowed with
an investment project, depositors are endowed with e units of wealth (in terms of
the numeraire), and banks are endowed with a monitoring technology and e units of
wealth.
Investment projects are indivisible and non-transferable. The owner of the project
needs to invest I units of the numeraire to get a return R units (also in terms of the
numeraire), with some probability, if the project succeeds (and 0 otherwise). The
investor can exert eﬀort to increase the probability of success of the project. If she
performs eﬀort the project succeed with probability pH , assumed greater than the
probability pL obtained when no eﬀort is exerted. However, eﬀort is costly and non-
observable by third parties. Let B be the cost, in utility terms, for an investor to
perform eﬀort and ∆p ≡ pH − pL.
Assumption 1.
A1.a. pHR− 1β I −B > 0 > pLR− 1β I
A1.b. R − 1
β
I < B
∆p
.
Assumption A1.a implies that only project undertaken with high eﬀort have pos-
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itive net present value when there is perfect information. Assumption A1.b implies
that investors are subject to a moral hazard problem. How important these assump-
tions are will become apparent in the next section.
The returns of the projects within a country have a tight pattern of correlation.
At any date t, if we observe that a project undertaken using eﬀort has failed in
that period, then we know that all the other projects undertaken with eﬀort also
failed (this happens (1 − pH) of the times). Similarly, projects carried out with no
eﬀort fail every time the eﬀort-projects fail, and some other times (so that they fail
(1−pL) > (1−pH) of the times). In other words, the event of success of any particular
project does not constitute an idiosyncratic shock to a particular project, but a shock
to the entire country (or region) where the project is located.
The monitoring technology allows its owners to perfectly monitor the eﬀort level
of investors undertaking projects. The activity of monitoring is costly and non-
observable. Let c denote the per-project cost of monitoring.
The CB can tax the young-generation members of the group of depositors (and
only them) in order to Þnance a bailout of the banking sector.2 Let τ denote the
per-capita tax. However, when the CB raises an amount τ from taxation, only τ/ξ
becomes available for the use of the CB. We consider the case of ξ ≥ 1. This assump-
tion is intended to capture an extra administrative (and possibly the dead-weight
loss) cost of taxation. When the CB prints money to Þnance the banking-system
bailout we will interpret τ as the proxy for the inßationary tax. Large values of ξ can
be associated to situations where the excess of money creation prompts a currency
crash that brings along a disruption in other sectors of the economy.3
2This is just a normalization. We could allow the government to tax all agents in the economy.
What really matters is the net transfer that the agents get from the insurance scheme (the bailout).
We choose this simpliÞcation because only young depositors get a negative transfer in every possible
case (the tax).
3Note that there is no money in the economy. For this reason we may say that this paper presents
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Assume that depositors as a group, after depositing a total per capita amountD in
the banks during the Þrst period of their lives, engage in overlapped (non-contingent)
transactions and payment commitments among themselves for the amount γD, where
γ is the gross interest rate.4 Depositors will not be able to fulÞll those commitments in
the second period of their lives if they receive (in per capita terms) less than γD from
the banking sector. As a consequence, there is a disruption in economic activities
and depositors experience a per capita utility loss ν. This assumption will motivate
the existence of central bank bailouts in the model.5
Finally note that since risk neutrality implies linear utility functions, the level
of deposits will be determined by the demand side of the market for funds. DeÞne
Y ≡ βpL c∆p and X ≡ β
2ν
ξ−β .
Assumption 2.
A2.a. I < α−θ
1−α
³
e− ξ
β
X
´
.
A2.b. e > (1−α)
θ
Y.
A2.c. Y < I < Y + α−θ
1−αX.
AssumptionA2.a implies that there are enough deposits in the economy to Þnance
all projects. AssumptionA2.b implies that bank-monitors have enough own funds to
deal with their moral hazard problem. Finally, assumption A2.c limits the relative
size of total deposits in the system. We will discuss the consequences of abandoning
this last assumption at the end of next section.
The agents endowed with the monitoring technology will play the role of banks in
a Þscal theory of dollarization.
4Throughout the paper we adopt the following notation: for any variable x, we denote by x its
aggregate per capita value.
5See Peck and Shell (1999) for a discussion on another way to model the payment services provided
by demand deposits (theirs is an environment with indivisibilities in payments). It is important to
notice though that in the set-up of the present paper the depositors utility cost is directly associated
to an aggregate failure of the Þnancial sector. It is not a cost that could be individually avoided.
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the model. Banks get paid an amount φ for the service of monitoring. Additionally
the CB imposes a capital requirement on banks Im. Entrepreneurs borrow I units
of funds from the banks and pay back γI + φ if the project succeeds (and zero
otherwise). The bank in turn pays γ(I − Im) (per project) to depositors. It will be
convenient to express S ≡ γIm+φ where γ is the equilibrium gross interest rate paid
on entrepreneurs borrowed funds and φ is the banks net fee from monitoring.
3 Benevolent Equilibrium
First we consider the case where the government-central bank is benevolent and cares
equally about depositors and project owners (young and old). Bank-monitors always
obtain zero net surplus in equilibrium so we can abstract from them in the welfare
considerations.
Definition 1 We say that the economy is in a crisis when the investment projects
done exerting eﬀort fail. Let s ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator of the state of the economy:
s = 1 when economy is in a crisis, and s = 0 when it is not.6
Let T (D,D, s) ≥ 0 be the CB policy of payment to depositors in their second
period of life (contingent on the amount of the agents deposits D and the aggregate
per capita level of deposits D). Since we only consider steady states we drop the time
index to simplify notation. Depositors solve the following problem
maximize E[c1 + β
³
c2 − ν1c2<γD
´
]
6The deÞnition of a crisis is speciÞc to our environment. It is not of the self-fulÞlling type. It
is in fact closely associated to the performance of the real sector of the economy. For an excellent
discussion on more general deÞnitions of crises see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Kaminsky
and Reinhart also provide compelling evidence on the strong links between Þnancial crises and the
evolution of the real sector (they Þnd that weak output indicators signal the advent of 89 percent
of the banking crises they study).
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subject to
c1 = e−D − τ (s),
c2 =
(
γD + T (D,D, 0) if no crises,
T (D,D, 1) if crises,
where 1c2<γD is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when c2 ≤ γD and zero
otherwise. Note that depositors have to choose how much to save before knowing the
current realization of τ and that their utility cost ν is associated with an aggregate
outcome that can not be avoided by changing the individuals decision.
The benevolent CB maximizes the following welfare function:
W (T (D)) = (α− θ)[e−D − pHτ (0)− (1− pH)τ(1)+
β
³
pH(γD + T (D,D, 0)) + (1− pH)
³
T (D,D, 1)− ν1c2<γD
´´
]+
(1− α)β (pH(R− γI − φ)−B)
subject to
T (D,D, s) = τ(s)/ξ. (1)
We will call aBenevolent Equilibrium an equilibriumwhere depositors, entrepreneurs
and monitors maximize there life-time utility subject to their budget constraints,
D = D, the market for funds clears, and the government-CB chooses banking regu-
lation policies and transfers to maximize the proposed welfare functionW () subject
to the balance-budget restriction (1).
Proposition 1 Let A1 and A2 hold. Then there exists a Benevolent Equilibrium
where (i) the interest rate is γ∗ = 1/β, (ii) all projectowners get monitored by banks
that get paid a fee φ∗ = c/∆p− Y/β and, (iii) the CB imposes a capital requirement
on banks I∗m = Y and a transfers schedule
T ∗(D,D, s) =
(
γD if s = 1 and D ≤ DMAX
0 otherwise
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where DMAX = X.
Proof. The proof follows 5 steps.
Step 1: All project-owners getting the necessary credit to undertake the project
should be monitored.
First note that if the CB provides deposit insurance then it is in its best interest to
have all projects being made with eﬀort. To see this, suppose projects are carried out
with no eﬀort. Since depositors have deposit insurance we still have that γ∗ = 1/β.
Entrepreneurs obtain pL(R− γ∗I) from their projects. Also, by A1.a we have that
0 < pHR− 1
β
I −B < R − 1
β
I,
which tells us that the entrepreneurs get a positive payoﬀ from their projects. Fur-
thermore, it follows fromA1.b that this payoﬀ is greater than the one obtained when
exerting eﬀort. However, the situation for the CB is diﬀerent. The CB internalizes
the fact that extra taxes are needed to Þnance the deposit insurance if the projects
are carried out with no eﬀort. The net payoﬀ for the CB can be reduced to the
following expression
(1− α)β[pL(R− γI)]− (α− θ)(1− pL)τ ,
where from (1) we have that τ = ξγD = ξγ(1 − α)I/(α − θ).7 It is not hard to
show (after some algebra) that this expression is negative when γ = 1/β. Hence, the
CB will want to implement a banking policy that induces agents to undertake their
project with eﬀort.
Now, recall that since the project owners have no wealth, they need a credit of I
units to be able to carry out the project. By A1.b we have that
R− γI − φ ≤ R− γI < B
∆p
,
7Since the number of young depositors being taxed is the same as the number of old depositors
beneÞting from CB insurance, the balanced budget restriction reduces to the expression in the text.
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and hence
pL(R− γI − φ) > pH(R− γI − φ)−B,
which means that the incentive compatibility constraint that would induce entrepreneurs
to exert eﬀort is not satisÞed and that the only way to induce eﬀort is through bank
monitoring.
Step 2: The CB imposes a capital requirement I∗m on banks and banks get payed
a fee φ∗.
Assume that banks do not get deposit insurance on their deposit.8 Two incen-
tive conditions on the behavior of banks need to be considered. On one hand, the
participation constraint is given by
β (pHS − c) ≥ Im, (2)
which says that (potential) monitors can choose between becoming a bank (in which
case, they commit Im units of funds per project monitored and get paid S with some
probability in the future), or simply consuming their endowment during their Þrst
period of life. Note that since banks do not get deposit insurance and βpHγIm ≤
Im we can conclude that they will not make direct deposits in the system at the
equilibrium interest rate γ. On the other hand, incentive compatibility requires that
the following condition holds
pHS − c ≥ pLS. (3)
The CB sets a reserve requirement Im that minimize the equilibrium bank fee φ
∗. In
fact, using constraints (2) and (3) we can see that if the CB sets Im = Y, competition
among banks will drive φ∗ to its minimum feasible value (see Figure 1).
Step 3: If T ∗(D,D, s) < γD then T ∗(D,D, s) = 0. And T ∗(D,D, 0) = 0.
8This is mainly for convenience. The analysis can be carried out with deposit insurance over
bank-deposits with only minor changes.
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Recall that in equilibrium D = D. Using the results from Step 2, we can rewrite
W (T (D)) as
cW = (α− θ)[e−D − pHτ(0)− (1− pH)τ (1)]+
+βpHγ(α− θ)D + (α− θ)β
Ã
pH
τ (0)
ξ
+ (1− pH)
Ã
τ (1)
ξ
− ν1c2<γD
!!
+
+(1− α)β
Ã
pH(R− c
∆p
)−B
!
− βpHγ(1− α)(I − Im). (4)
By A2.a the market clearing condition for funds is given by
(1− α)(I − Im) = (α− θ)D.
By substituting this condition in cW it is easy to see that the second and last term
on the right hand side of equation (4) cancel out. Then, we obtain
cW = (α− θ)(e−D − Ã1− β
ξ
!
[pHτ (0) + (1− pH)τ (1)]
)
−
−(α− θ)β(1− pH)ν1c2<γD + (1− α)β
Ã
pH(R − c
∆p
)−B
!
.
Since β/ξ is less than one, it becomes apparent from this expression that the CB
should set τ (0) = 0 and τ (1) = 0 whenever τ (1) is not suﬃcient to fully insure total
deposits D plus interest payments. Hence, the claim in Step 3 follows.
Step 4: The equilibrium interest rate under policy T ∗(D,D, s) is γ∗ = 1/β.
By A2.c we have that D < DMAX . Entrepreneurs need funds. Hence D has to
be positive in equilibrium. From the depositors problem, this implies that γ∗ ≥ 1/β.
By assumption A2.a we get that γ∗ ≤ 1/β or otherwise there would be an excess
supply of deposited funds.
Step 5: The CB sets transfers to T ∗(D,D, s).
By Step 3 we only need to compare the value of cW when the CB sets τ(1) equal
to zero with the case when τ(1) = ξγD. Hence, the CB should set τ (1) = ξγD only
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when the following inequality holds
(α− θ)
(
e−D −
Ã
1− β
ξ
!
(1− pH)ξγD
)
+ (1− α)β
Ã
pH(R− c
∆p
)−B
!
>
(α− θ)[e−D − β(1− pH)ν] + (1− α)β
Ã
pH(R− c
∆p
)−B
!
,
which in turn reduces to the simpler expression
(ξ − β)γD < βν. (5)
Hence, when the equilibrium interest rate γ∗ = 1/β (as shown in Step 4), we have
that the CB will implement full deposit insurance whenever D < DMAX ≡ β2ν/(ξ −
β). Finally, suppose that
(ξ − β)γD > βν,
when γ = 1/β. If the CB sets T (D) = 0 the equilibrium interest rate will be γ0 =
1/pHβ. From expressions (2) and (3) we know that Im is independent of γ (and so is
D, see Figure 1). Therefore, the following inequality holds
(ξ − β) 1
pHβ
D > (ξ − β) 1
β
D > βν,
which veriÞes that T (D) = 0 is in fact the policy that a benevolent CB would like to
pursue. This, together with Step 3, proves the claim in Step 5.
Whether the CB wishes to implement a system of deposit insurance depends on
several factors in the model (see expression (5)). It is useful to make a special mention
to three of them here as they are always of major importance for the discussion of the
general problem. First note that the higher the cost ν to depositors associated with
the economic turmoil caused by the crisis, the more likely will be that the CB chooses
to have a deposit insurance system. Second, the higher the administrative and dis-
tortionary costs of taxation (higher ξ), the less attractive will be the implementation
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of a generalized deposit insurance. Finally, the size of the Þnancial system (measure
here by the size of D) is important for the evaluation of the costs of implementing
a deposit insurance system. This last fact appears in the model as a consequence of
the pure transfer of resources among depositors (from young to old) that is involved
in the Þnancing of the deposit insurance scheme. More generally, the model suggests
that it is important to determine the size of the reallocation of funds induced by the
deposit insurance system when deciding about its implementation.
Consider the following alternative assumption to A2.c:
(A2.c)0. I > Y + α−θ
1−αX
This is just saying that the equilibrium size of the banking system measured by
total deposits is relatively large. We will call Assumption A20 to the same set of
inequalities as in assumption A2 but with inequality (A2.c)0 replacing inequality
A2.c. Under this new assumption (i.e., when A2.c does not hold) the benevolent
equilibrium has γ∗ = 1/pHβ, τ (s) = 0 for all s and no deposit insurance. It is not hard
to show that even when the CB does not set a mandatory capital requirement, com-
petition among banks and the necessity of entrepreneurs to attract external funding
will drive the monitoring fee to its minimum level φ∗ = c/pH . This system resem-
bles a certiÞcation market for projects where the function of bank-monitors is only
to certify that the investors are eﬀectively exerting the required level of eﬀort (see
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) for details).
4 Political Equilibrium
Instead of letting the benevolent central bank decide whether to run an (implicit)
deposit insurance policy, we now consider a scenario in which this decision is the
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outcome of a political process.9 Assume that only depositors and entrepreneurs vote
and that they vote according to their respective payoﬀs obtained under the diﬀerent
systems (bank-monitors are indiﬀerent between systems as competition always drives
their payoﬀ down to the participation constraint). In other words, each agent decides
her vote with the belief that she will be decisive. Agents that are indiﬀerent between
systems do not vote.10 The timing of events is as follows: at the beginning of each
period, agents vote for a system. Then, the system with more than 50% of the
votes gets implemented and agents make the rest of their economic decisions. Finally
uncertainty about the return of the projects in the region gets realized and agents
obtain their period-payoﬀs. The choice of the timing is important here. We could
alternatively have assumed that each period voting takes place after the uncertainty
is resolved. One could argue that this addresses more directly the ex-ante/ex-post
choice-of-policy conßict (time inconsistency) faced by voters. However, in our current
simpliÞed set up this alternative timing of events renders the voting decisions devoid
of any interesting content. Moreover, we may say that such a timing is not necessarily
the best way to represent real-world situations where the deepness of the crisis and
the time when the bailouts are decided is not so clear-cut.
After the political process takes place, if a deposit insurance scheme is imple-
mented we assume that the CB follows the optimal transfers and capital-requirement
policies described in the previous section (see the proof of Proposition 1).11 Es-
sentially the voter needs to choose between being in an equilibrium with an optimal
9Political institutions are taken as given in this paper. Bolton and Rosenthal (1999) study
an economy where the political arrangements that determine an ex-post bailout policy can be in-
terpreted as arising endogenously to remedy contractual incompleteness. However, their setup is
substantially diﬀerent from ours in that they consider ex-post heterogeneous investors and voting
decisions that take place after types get privately revealed.
10For an excellent discussion of politico-economic equilibrium see Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull
(1997).
11This rules out cases where the (implicit) bailout induces excessive risk-taking behavior by bor-
rowers.
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deposit insurance like the one in Proposition 1 or with no deposit insurance at all.
Let h ∈ {h1, h2} be a state variable that indicates the result of the ballot. If
the deposit insurance proposal gets the majority of the votes h takes the value h1,
otherwise h = h2. Given the timing of events, it seems natural to consider that the
interest rate γ for the current period will be contingent on the value of h in the
following period. Finally, we will call T h(D,D) the transfers function under system
h, i.e., T h1(D,D) = γ(h)D and T h2(D,D) = 0. With the elements just described,
we can deÞne a Political Equilibrium in the obvious way. The following proposition
shows that even when a benevolent central bank chooses not to set up a deposit
insurance system, the political process may approve one.
Proposition 2 LetA1 andA2 0 hold. Then there exist a Political Equilibrium where
(i) the interest rate is γ∗ = 1/β, and (ii) the deposit insurance system is implemented.
Proof. First note that γ(h1) = 1/β and γ(h2) = 1/pHβ as agents in the model
have perfect foresight about the political outcomes. We have assumed that agents
believe they are decisive when they decide their votes. If a depositor believes that the
deposit-insurance proposal will not be accepted next period, then she will only agree
to deposit her funds at an interest rate of at least 1/pHβ. Also, by assumption A2.a
the market clearing interest rate can not be greater than 1/pHβ. It follows then that
γ(h2) = 1/pHβ. Similarly, conditional on h1 the market clearing interest rate will be
given by 1/β, i. e., γ(h1) = 1/β.
Consider now the voting decisions of the relevant agents:
(i) old depositors expected payoﬀ at the voting time is given by
pHγ(h)D + (1− pH)[T h(D,D)− ν1Th(D,D)<γD].
Now, if h = h1 then their payoﬀ is γ(h1)D and if h = h2 then their payoﬀ is
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pHγ(h2)D − (1− pH)ν. Since
γ(h1)D =
1
β
D >
1
β
D − (1− pH)ν = pHγ(h2)D − (1− pH)ν
we have that old depositors will vote in favor of the deposit insurance system;
(ii) young depositors expected payoﬀ is
pH(e−D)+ (1− pH)[e−D− τ(h)]+β[pHγ0D+(1−pH)
³
T 0(D,D)− ν1T 0(D,D)<γ0D
´
]
where T 0 is taken as given by these agents (it will be decided next period) but equi-
librium consistency requires that T 0 be the winning policy in next period ballot.
Obviously without a deposit insurance system in place young depositors avoid tax-
ation during the crisis and obtain higher expected payoﬀs. Hence young depositors
will vote against deposit insurance;
(iii) young entrepreneurs payoﬀ does not depend on the voting decisions of the
current period. As a result, they do not vote;
(iv) old entrepreneurs have an expected payoﬀ given by
β
"
pH
Ã
R− γ(h)(I − Im)− c
∆p
!
−B
#
.
Since γ(h1) < γ(h2) and I − Im > 0 we have that old entrepreneurs will vote for the
deposit insurance.
In summary, the old generation votes for the deposit insurance system but only
the depositors of the young generation vote against. Hence the deposit insurance
proposal will win in a political contest that repeats itself every period. The interest
rate in the political equilibrium is then γ∗ = γ(h1) = 1/β.
At the end of the previous section we showed that when AssumptionsA1 andA20
hold the Benevolent Equilibrium will have no deposit insurance in place. However,
Proposition 2 shows that if the government is subject to political pressure and its
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decisions are determined primarily by this pressure, then it may be that in equilibrium
(Political Equilibrium) the deposit insurance system actually makes its way into the
monetary-banking arrangements of the economy. In this case, the government may
beneÞt from a policy that shuts down ex-ante the sources of funds that are used to
Þnance the insurance system. This brings us to our formal deÞnition of dollarization
in this environment.
Definition 2 A Period-td Dollarization is the CB policy that sets τ(s, h, t) ≡ 0 for
all t ≥ td.
This is why we call our study a Þscal theory of dollarization.12 There is no money
in our model. As we argue in the introduction, the inßationary tax is generally use in
bailouts of the banking sector. It plays the role of an emergency tax. Dollarization
is then a way to block this source of funds. We consider that our speciÞcation captures
well this essential feature of the problem. Note that the previous deÞnition describes
dollarization as an irreversible policy. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2000) cast some
doubts on the appropriateness of this strict deÞnition. They provide examples of
regional economies that have been able to (re-) introduce a local currency into the
system during periods of Þnancial distress. Velde and Veracierto (2000) also discuss
this point and they provide some speciÞc arrangements that a government could use
in order to adopt a credibly irreversible dollarization policy.
Let us call Benevolent Outcome the outcome of a Benevolent Equilibrium as de-
scribe in Proposition 1. Then the following proposition directly follows.
Proposition 3 Let A1 and A2 0 hold. The CB can implement the Benevolent Out-
come by establishing a Dollarization at the beginning of time, i.e., with td = 1.
12For a similar perspective on the Þscal disciplining role of dollarization see Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2000).
18
We can then say that in this environment the dollarization policy allows the CB
to commit to a policy of no de-facto deposit insurance. In a sense, by adopting
dollarization the government-CB is able to resists the political pressures to bailout
the banking system undergoing a period of crisis. However, this solution leaves us
with the next natural question: how does the government-CB Þnds political support
for the dollarization? The next proposition shows that dollarization will not Þnd the
support of a majority of voters at any given period t.
Proposition 4 Let A1 and A2 0 hold. Then, a Period-t Dollarization is not a
Political Equilibrium of the economy for any t ≥ 1.
Proof. The proof follows the same logic as that of Proposition 2. Nevertheless,
the voting decisions are now changed due to the permanent nature (irreversibility) of
dollarization. Let us use the variable d ∈ {d1, d2} to indicate whether the system is
dollarized (d1) or not dollarized (d2). From Proposition 2 we know that
γ∗(d2) = γ(h1, d2) =
1
β
,
and that T ∗(D,D; d2) = T h(D,D). It is also straightforward to see that
γ∗(d1) = γ(h, d1) =
1
pHβ
.
Consider now the voting decisions for the diﬀerent agents in the economy:
(i) old depositors payoﬀ is given by
pHγ
∗(d)D + (1− pH)
h
T ∗(D,D; d)− ν1T ∗(D,D;d)<γD
i
.
If d = d1 then their payoﬀ is given by (1/β)D − (1− pH)ν, and if d = d2 it is given
by (1/β)D. Hence, old depositors vote against the dollarization proposal.
(ii) young depositors payoﬀ is given by
e−D − (1− pH)τ∗ + β
h
pHγ
∗(d)D + (1− pH)(T ∗(D,D; d)− ν1T ∗(D,D;d)<γD)
i
,
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where τ ∗ = ξT ∗(D,D; d). Note that when voting on dollarization the young agents
may actually be able to inßuence their old-age payoﬀ. This is not true with the voting
of deposit insurance every period as in Proposition 2. Now, if d = d1 their payoﬀ is
e−D+β[(1/β)D− (1−pH)ν] and if d = d2 their payoﬀ is e−D− (1− pH)(ξ/β)D+
β(1/β)D. Hence, young depositors will vote in favor of dollarization whenever the
following inequality holds
βν <
ξ
β
D. (6)
But by Assumption (A2.c)0 we know that D = D > DMAX in equilibrium which
implies that inequality (6) always holds. That is, young depositors will favor dollar-
ization in equilibrium;
(iii) Both young and old entrepreneurs can now decide by voting (or at least they
believe so) which interest rate on loans they wish to face. Since γ∗(d1) > γ∗(d2), they
vote against dollarization.13
As a result, the dollarization proposal does not get suﬃcient support and it is not
a Political Equilibrium of the model.
One may think thatProposition 4 is an artiÞcial consequence of the generational
structure of our model. However, an interesting general insight comes out from this
speciÞc result. The proposition suggests that even when dollarization is considered
the best policy for society overall, the CB may have to wait for an appropriate
time to launch the proposal. When political considerations become important, it
seems essential for the success of the dollarization plan to Þnd a time-period in which
there is a relatively small group of depositors getting positive net transfers from a
13Entrepreneurs payoﬀ is still given by
β
·
pH
µ
R− γ(d)(I − Im)− c
∆p
¶
−B
¸
and Im is independent of d (see Figure 1).
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contingent bailout of the banking sector (old depositors in the model are the net-
transfers recipients).
5 The Banking System
As we saw in the previous section, dollarization may be a useful policy for the CB
to be able to commit itself and not get involved in banking-sector bailouts that are
detrimental for society overall. However, we also showed that in these situations
it is sometimes diﬃcult to obtain the political support necessary to implement the
dollarization policy. But even if the CB can gain the voters advocacy for the proposal,
another important open question still arise: what should the CB do when a crisis
come? One possibility could be to try to avoid these banking crises altogether (even
at the cost of mayor economic restructuring). For this, international banks ought to
be seriously considered (see Calvo (2000)).
Suppose that the domestic economy considered in the previous two sections is
in fact part of a large group of independent economies (countries) that form the
world. Also assume that the event of project-success in each of the diﬀerent countries
is uncorrelated. Hence, an international bank could fully diversify its portfolio of
projects and always get a proportion pH of success per period (see Ennis, 2000).
In that case, the agency problem at the monitors level disappears and no capital
requirements are necessary for international banks. Assume however that there exists
an extra operational cost of having a fully diversiÞed widespread institution. Let that
cost be proportional to the size of the bank and denote by δ the per-depositor cost.
For most of the results in the section we will set δ = 0.
Let us call P i the amount paid to the international bank by a successful en-
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trepreneur with a credit of I units. It is not hard to see that
P i =
γ
pH
I + φi.
Note that the interest rate over the loan is higher than the interest rate over deposits.
This spread is due to the fact that this system removes the subsidy over loans implicit
in the deposit insurance scheme.
Since anyone owning a monitoring technology can set up an international bank,
the following zero-proÞt condition will hold in equilibrium,
pHP
i = γI + c+ δ,
This implies that international banks charge a fee φi given by
φi =
c+ δ
pH
.
Let P ∗ be the amount paid to banks by entrepreneurs with a loan of I units under
the de-facto deposit-insurance system. From the previous section we have that
P ∗ = γ∗I + φ∗,
where γ∗ = 1/β and φ∗ = (1− pL)c/∆p. When δ = 0 we have that φ∗ > φi. However
it may still well be that P i > P ∗ since the interest rate on loans is higher under
the international-banks system. This is important because when P i > P ∗ the inter-
national banks will not be used by the entrepreneurs of an economy with (implicit)
deposit insurance. We can now compare the value of the benevolent-CB objective
function under the alternative systems: the deposit insurance system (W (γD)) and,
the international-banks system (W i). Simple algebra give us the following expression,
W (γD)−W i = (1− α)βpH(P i − P ∗)− (α− θ)(1− pH)τ(1),
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which clearly shows that even when international banks are not used in equilibrium
(i.e., P i > P ∗) it could be the case that it would be best for the economy overall to
have them functioning (i.e. W (γD)−W < 0).
So far we have considered the de-facto deposit-insurance system to be the default
system. This makes sense since we have proved in the previous sections that it is the
system that the Political Equilibrium will select. But for reasons that will become
clear below, it is also interesting to consider the eﬀects of international banking under
a dollarization policy. As before, let us call P d the sum that entrepreneurs with I
units of credit pay to banks. From the previous section we know that
P d = γdI + φd =
1
pHβ
I +
c
pH
,
where we have deÞned γd ≡ γ∗(d1) to simply the notation of Section 4. Note that
P d = P i. Hence, entrepreneurs will be indiﬀerent between taking a credit from a
local bank or an international bank. However, since local banks fail with probability
(1−pH) and depositors suﬀer a loss ν when this happens, in equilibrium international
banks will capture deposits and they can prevail over local banks.14 This result
is important. Consider the situation where the CB prefers the international-banks
system over the deposit-insurance system, that is when W (γD) < W i. If the CB can
implement a dollarization - plus - international-banks system then it will be able to
obtain the desire W i.
In summary, we have seen that when a (perhaps implicit) deposit insurance is
into place, international banks will not be used even when they are beneÞcial for the
society as a whole. However, when the economy is dollarized, international banks will
14There is a coordination issue here that we chose to put aside. When all but one depositor do
business with local banks, the one individual remaining will be indiﬀerent between depositing in the
international banks or in the domestic banks. This is because either way, under the crisis situation,
she will experience the utility cost ν due to transactions-payments disruption. Note that we are
assuming here that all depositors choose the international bank even in this situation.
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be extensively used in equilibrium. Dollarization and international banking are in a
sense good complements.
An important question still remains: would the international banking plus dollar-
ization policy obtain suﬃcient political support to be implementable? The following
proposition suggest a possible answer.
Proposition 5 Let A1 and A2 0 hold. If 2(1− α) < (α− θ) then the dollarization
- plus - international-banks policy constitutes a Political Equilibrium.
Proof. When voting, agents will compare their payoﬀ in the (implicit) deposit
insurance system with their payoﬀ in a dollarization - plus - international-banks
system. This is because the political equilibrium without dollarization have a deposit
insurance policy as the outcome. Consider Þrst the voting decision of depositors. Old
depositors get (1/β)D in either system and hence they do not vote. Young depositors
get
e−D − (1− pH)τ + βγ∗D∗
in the deposit-insurance system and e − D − βγiDi in the dollarization - plus -
international-banks system. Since γi = γ∗ = 1/β young depositors will vote in favor
of dollarization. Finally, the payoﬀ for both young and old entrepreneurs is given by
β [pH(R− P )−B] .
Two possible cases need to be consider here. First, when P i < P ∗ it is clear that
entrepreneurs will vote for dollarization. Then, dollarization wins the ballot by una-
nimity. Second, when P i > P ∗ entrepreneurs vote for the status quo, that is, the
implicit deposit-insurance system. However, since 2(1 − α) < (α − θ) holds, dollar-
ization still dominates the votes and hence it will get implemented.
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Note that once international banks are introduced, whether the economy is dol-
larized or not does not inßuence the equilibrium outcome. However, dollarization
is important to ensure that investors and depositors operate with the international
banks in equilibrium. In the dollarized economy the domestic banking system pro-
vides no deposit insurance and hence international banks can prevail.
The assumption that 2(1 − α) < (α − θ) is a statement about the relative size-
distribution of net debtors and creditors in the voting population. It says that the
number of net creditors per generation is at least twice the number of net debtors.
We are inclined to believe that this is a realistic assumption, but our analysis can
certainly be done without such a restriction. Dollarization - plus - international-banks
will not always be a political equilibrium in that case though.
6 Conclusions
There is at least two possible ways to think about the role of dollarization during a
Þnancial crisis. On the one hand, one could think that dollarization tends to reduce
the chances of an expectations-driven currency collapse (see Velde and Veracierto
(2000) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2000). On the other hand, it could
be that dollarization is a suitable mechanism to avoid the ampliÞcation of a domestic
banking crisis into a more general overall country default. The views expressed in
the present paper are closer in spirit to this second line of interpretation (see Chang
and Velasco (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for a detailed discussion on
the nature of Þnancial crises under this view).
Our set-up is highly stylized. We do not intend to be descriptive in any way.
Instead, the objective of the paper is to illustrate the interaction between the relative
performance of the banking sector and those government policies oriented to cope
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with its sporadic major breakdowns. We stress the role that the political process
may play in the determination of speciÞc policies, and in particular in the decision of
whether or not to dollarize the economy. We show that it may be optimal for society
as a whole to adopt a dollarization system to hinder the political pressures that favor
a banking sector bailout during a crisis. But, we also show that when introduced
alone dollarization faces substantial political opposition, reducing its chances of ac-
tual implementation. The reasons for this result are somewhat distinct. Our model
presents a partial theory of dollarization that stresses its role as a crisis policy. We
view dollarization as an instrument that the Central Bank can use to commit not to
get involved in pernicious transfer schemes during periods of Þnancial distress. There
is no annual seignorage loss associated with dollarization in our model (see Berg
and Borensztein (2000) and also Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2000) for some quantitative assessments of the possible losses associated
with dollarization). However, under a non-dollarized system there is always a latent
mass-transfer of resources via bailouts ready to be triggered by the surge of major
banking-sector turmoil. When the transfer goes from a small group (less politically
powerful) to a large group (more politically powerful), it can undermine the political
support for dollarization, even in cases where dollarization is an otherwise socially
beneÞcial policy. The account may seem pessimistic up to that point. But we also
show that there exists an alternative policy that can achieve the desired no-bailouts
outcome: the introduction-promotion of international banks. This indeed can suﬃ-
ciently increase the political support for dollarization. And simultaneously, dollariza-
tion is an essential component to the promotion of international banks as it curtails
the implicit subsidy attached to the use of domestic Þnancial institutions. Hence, the
combination of dollarization and bank internationalization can solve the problem of
having in place transfers schemes (implicit banking bailout) that are detrimental for
26
society as a whole.
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